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Abstract
With increasing ubiquity of artificial intelligence (AI) in modern societies, individual
countries and the international community are working hard to create an innovation-
friendly, yet safe, regulatory environment. Adequate regulation is key to maximize
the benefits and minimize the risks stemming from AI technologies. Developing reg-
ulatory frameworks is, however, challenging due to AI’s global reach and the exis-
tence of widespread misconceptions about the notion of regulation. We argue that
AI-related challenges cannot be tackled effectively without sincere international coordi-
nation supported by robust, consistent domestic and international governance arrange-
ments. Against this backdrop, we propose the establishment of an international AI
governance framework organized around a new AI regulatory agency that — drawing
on interdisciplinary expertise — could help creating uniform standards for the regula-
tion of AI technologies and inform the development of AI policies around the world.
We also believe that a fundamental change of mindset on what constitutes regulation
is necessary to remove existing barriers that hamper contemporary efforts to develop
AI regulatory regimes, and put forward some recommendations on how to achieve this,
and what opportunities doing so would present.
1 Introduction
Emerging technologies commonly described by the generic term artificial intelligence (AI)
are becoming increasingly pervasive in human society. They are extremely transformative,
advance rapidly, and affect virtually all aspects of our existence: Self-driving cars are being
released on the roads. AI-driven medical diagnosis tools sometimes outperform humans
in catching rare diagnoses. Product recommendation systems analyze our needs and opti-
mize our shopping experience. Automated surveillance techniques, killer bots, and other
weaponized AI technologies shore up the defenses of our countries. Powerful data mining
applications allow us to sift through a wealth of information within a short period of time.
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AI is revolutionizing financial services with applications reaching from detecting fraud, tax
evasion, or money laundering to regulatory technology (RegTech), enhancing regulatory
processes like monitoring, reporting, and compliance. The justice system increasingly relies
on AI-enabled decision-making systems for predictive policing and sentencing. And the list
of examples could go on.
Undoubtedly, some of these technologies can make life a lot easier by providing previ-
ously unimaginable benefits. But, given their highly disruptive nature, they also present
substantial challenges. Sometimes these problems result from the imperfection of AI appli-
cations, as when AI systems produce discriminatory biases, or inappropriate inferences due
to biases in training data [11, 14]. At other times, issues arise because AI is doing its job
far too perfectly, as evidenced by the increasing privacy threat posed by pattern recognition
applications [31]. Some AI applications lead to human de-skilling [11]. Some instantiations
of AI are ethically questionable (e.g., child-like sex bots [42]) or potentially dangerous (e.g.,
autonomous weapons systems). Less obviously, AI innovation may also raise broader sys-
temic challenges in the economic [5], legal [17], and many other domains, likely forcing us to
reevaluate many of our most fundamental ethical, legal, and social paradigms. The overall
destabilization of the international community through what is commonly referred to as the
AI race — a dangerous competition for technological superiority between AI developers,
countries, and regional groupings, encouraging safety and governance corner-cutting and
potentially exacerbate existing or even create new conflict situations [13] — is yet another
danger we face in relation to AI. For a good overview of the contemporary AI landscape
and policy environment, see [12].
In order to optimally harness AI’s benefits and address its potential risks — preferably
proactively rather than retroactively and in a manner beneficial to all humanity — it is
indispensable to develop adequate policies in relation to AI technologies at the earliest pos-
sible stage. Society’s growing interest in and anxiety over AI — fueled by incessant hype
and shocking scandals, respectively — are putting additional pressure on policymakers.
The AI community has long been calling for policy action, with criticism getting louder
on the growing legal vacuum in virtually every domain affected by technological advance-
ment [48, 10, 50]. Policymakers around the world have begun to address AI policy challenges.
International organizations and groupings have put forward and/or are in the process of de-
veloping ethical principles, policy guidelines, and reports concerning AI to provide guidance
and assist policymakers’ efforts to tackle AI challenges [6, 52, 20, 34, 23, 45, 21]. Countries
have started to launch ambitious strategies to promote the development and commercializa-
tion of AI with a view to maintain sustained economic competitiveness after the inevitable
global transition to an AI-driven economy [33, 47, 37, 36, 22, 19]. There are also many aca-
demic, joint public-private sector, and other venues that support governments in promoting
AI R&D. Examples include the International Association for Artificial Intelligence and Law,
the Partnership on AI, The Future Society, the Artificial Intelligence Forum of New Zealand,
and SPARC in the EU. More indirectly, cutting-edge tech firms like Amazon, Apple, Baidu,
Google, Facebook, IBM, Microsoft, and others are also instrumental in shaping AI policies.
Courts, faced with first AI-related disputes, contribute to clarifying situations, although
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some decisions reflect a complete lack of technological expertise [16, 32]. Such decisions add
to, rather than decrease, confusion and underscore the need for interdisciplinary cooperation
and improving policymakers’ AI expertise [12].
These diverse societal stakeholders enthusiastically engage in shaping our future with AI.
Yet the question remains: Do these applications really make human society more efficient,
better, or safer? Or is AI rather a looming menace that will ultimately destroy mankind [29]?
In any case, both the AI revolution and the challenges it presents to society are very real
and policymakers’ efforts to do something about it must continue.
The importance of adequately regulating AI cannot be overstated. History and eco-
nomic research shows that societal benefits from technological innovation — including AI
— cannot be taken for granted, but are largely determined by the quality of the market-
structuring regulatory environment [30]: Appropriate regulation corrects market failures by
incentivizing socially optimal behavior, ensuring that the benefits of innovation are equally
distributed across society. Poorly designed or inappropriately implemented policy measures
may, however, impair the status quo by aggravating inequalities and generating tensions
between the winners and losers of innovation. In some (perhaps many) cases, some or all
segments of society are unnecessarily disadvantaged by uses of AI-driven technology. In-
adequate regulatory interventions and protracted periods of uncertainty during regulatory
adjustments may also irreversibly destroy society’s trust in new technologies. This, in turn,
may thwart their societal adoption or even annihilate entire emerging markets, withholding
potentially substantial benefits from society [38].
Once an issue — such as the emergence of AI technologies — is constructed as a problem
and the need for regulation is correctly identified, the next question is how we come up with
a regulatory regime that stimulates trust, enables innovation yet also provides safety, and
yields socially optimal outcomes? What factors impact on the efficiency of regulation?
Addressing them all would not be possible in one paper (but see [7] for a comprehensive
treatise). Thus, we will concentrate on three interrelated issues that are paramount in the
AI context: (1) Why the nature of lawmaking commands international coordination, (2)
the importance of institutional architecture in determining the quality of regulation, and
(3) practical communication challenges hindering contemporary AI policy development and
related regulatory design questions.
Regarding the nature of lawmaking, a number of peculiarities should be considered so
any newly conceived legal norms governing AI become truly authoritative, that is, accepted
as legitimate and institutionalized. Otherwise we risk creating merely formal or symbolic
rules without any impact on normative orientations and behavior [27]. While regulatory
initiatives are predominantly propelled by nation states to address problems at a domestic
level, caution is advised with purely national approaches. Whenever the regulation of an
issue has externalities that transcend national boundaries — as does AI regulation — dif-
fering domestic approaches tend to conflict, raising significant difficulties for those affected
by more than one regime. An additional problem in such cases is that domestic policymak-
ers’ ability and willingness to control the effects of their actions in foreign jurisdictions are
limited. These problems are then typically perceived as transnational in scope, with the
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consequence that actors increasingly deem national rules inapt to provide suitable solutions.
This discrepancy between the transnational nature of a problem and the national character
of the law governing it creates pressures for transnational regulation. Aligning the scope of
regulatory coordination with the reach of externalities has a number of benefits. First, it
is the only way to effectively control those externalities. Second, it also facilitates welfare
enhancing AI adoption instead of aggravating already pronounced worldwide inequalities,
which, in turn, could help increase social and political support [30, 7]. Transnational legal
ordering, however, is characterized by a set of complex, recursive, multi-directional pro-
cesses, which follow their own logic and crucially affect norms’ authority [26]. Although
the legitimacy of legal norms has predominantly social rather than moral roots, their ac-
ceptance also depends on the degree to which they conform to prevalent moral values of a
given society and — in the transnational context — are able to bridge the gaps between
conflicting morals of different cultures. Ethical considerations are thus an essential part of
any regulatory endeavor.
On the matter of institutional architecture, generally, people immediately associate reg-
ulation with its most visible aspect: the actual rules produced by regulators. As the tools
of regulation, rules are admittedly important. But such a narrow conception of regulation
ignores that developing rules to address a given problem is a small segment of the full reg-
ulatory process — a series of tasks from detecting an anomaly and devising an adequate
regulatory response to effective supervision, enforcement, as well as continuous assessment
and adaptation of regulatory regimes to ensure optimal performance, all of which must
seamlessly complement each other so that rules can be successful [7]. Throughout this pa-
per, when we speak of the efficiency or quality of regulation, or use the terms regulatory
regime and regulatory environment, we intend to refer to this comprehensive regulatory pro-
cess. One of those less palpable components of creating an enabling regulatory environment
— for AI as much as any other issue — is institutional architecture (sometimes also referred
to as governance framework or arrangements), which structures the collaboration of all
parties involved in policymaking. In part because the significant workload associated with
the urgency to issue tangible pieces of regulation typically exhausts regulators’ capacities,
architectural design questions are often neglected or even overlooked. This is unfortunate,
as they strongly affect the quality of both domestic and international AI regulation [7, 4].
We argue that it makes a huge difference whether international AI policy coordination oc-
curs in an ad-hoc, voluntary manner, or is streamlined by robust, consistent national and
international governance frameworks.
Turning to communication challenges and related regulatory design questions, another
prevalent misconception in relation to regulation is that it is some necessary evil that the
state imposes upon society to safeguard order and influence behavior in desired directions.
Again, while not inherently wrong, this view overlooks the modern reality of regulation,
which is much more a decentered, dynamic process of co-creation than a purely state-
driven enterprise [8]. Due to the immense complexity of most modern regulatory domains,
regulators generally lack both expertise and resources to face regulatory challenges by them-
selves. As a consequence, innovative, hybrid regulatory settings and strategies leveraging
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the collaboration and expertise of multiple societal stakeholders are typically superior to
their traditional counterparts, and increasingly taking over as the default mode of regula-
tion [7]. From this follows that regulation presents vital opportunities for diverse societal
stakeholders to instill their interests into regulatory processes early on. This improves the
odds of creating rules and regulatory frameworks — which may be binding or not depend-
ing on parties’ preferences — that more adequately reflect aggregate collective preferences.
We posit that this imperfect understanding of the notion of regulation is currently prevail-
ing among stakeholders. It clouds the aforementioned opportunities from their view and
evokes an overly cautious or even hostile attitude in them towards regulation, significantly
impeding AI regulatory efforts worldwide. We believe that targeted emphasis on educating
parties and clear communication about regulatory intentions, expectations, and opportuni-
ties could significantly alleviate these problems. In light of the fact that in AI regulation
both expertise and resource problems are heightened due to the field’s complexity and rapid
development, we urge for using these insights and see regulation as an opportunity rather
than an obstacle.
Against this background, we hold the view that efforts to develop AI policies, should,
from the very beginning, be coordinated and supported by adequate national, regional, and
international governance frameworks to avoid risks and inefficiencies stemming from the
imperfect interaction of fragmented domestic regulatory approaches. To date, such frame-
works are missing. AI policies are developed with limited levels of coordination between
governments and various academic and industry groupings. The regulatory purviews of
agencies involved in policymaking processes are not clearly delineated, and discussions on
issues of institutional architecture design are, if at all, in preliminary stages both within
governments and across various regional and international fora. In the preliminary version
of this paper [18], we proposed the establishment of a new intergovernmental organiza-
tion — potentially named International Artificial Intelligence Organization (IAIO) — to
serve as an international forum for discussion and engage in standard setting activities.
Marchant and Wallach [49] cultivate a similar idea proposing to set up what they term
governance coordination committees (GCCs) either at the national or international level,
as appropriate, depending on the issue area addressed. We suggested the IAIO should unite
a diverse group of stakeholders from public sector, industry, and academic organizations,
whose interdisciplinary expertise can support policymakers in the overwhelming and cru-
cially important task of regulating this novel, immensely complex, and largely uncharted
area. Our hope was that such a wide-scale, in-depth cooperation among all interested
stakeholders at this early stage would put national and international policymakers in the
position to take proactive action instead of lagging behind technological innovation with
potentially devastating implications. Yet, establishing a new body is not necessarily the
best and surely not the only option to achieve those goals: Since then, a number of new
initiatives led by existing and new groupings have emerged that could step up to assume
this function or spearhead discussions considering the pros and cons of repurposing other
existing bodies or establishing a new agency. The French-Canadian initiative to establish an
International Panel on Artificial Intelligence (IPAI) — renamed Global Partnership on AI,
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(GPAI) — the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) new AI
Policy Observatory (OECD.AI), the Global Governance on AI Roundtable (GGAR) hosted
by the World Government Summit (WGS), and a new work stream on AI within the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are among the most
prominent examples. Thus, in this paper we will also consider how these new developments
may tie in with our proposal.
The paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 will present a brief analysis of transnational
normmaking processes. This will provide the foundations for our proposal — introduced
in Section 3 — to establish a global AI governance framework organized around either a
new or an existing but repurposed intergovernmental organization as the lead global AI
policy body. Section 4 will look into the above mentioned communication challenges that
currently hamper regulatory efforts in the AI space and discuss related regulatory design
issues in a hope to improve the situation. Finally, we summarize our thoughts in a short
conclusion.
2 Dynamics of Transnational Lawmaking
In response to economic and cultural globalization, legal, political science, and sociology
scholarship have made many attempts to capture processes of various forms of transnational
social ordering. Examples include the traditional, purely state-centric legal notion of inter-
national law with a dichotomous view towards national and international law; global law,
which refers to legal norms of universal scope while also acknowledging the role of non-state
actors in normmaking; transnational law, which can have several connotations in reference
to norms with a more than national but less than global purview; the concept regime the-
ory developed by international relations scholars, which is likewise state-centric and has a
sole focus on international political processes without any regard to the impact of domestic
politics or law’s normativity; the sociological world polity theory, which studies the diffu-
sion of legal norms and assumes that global conceptual models frame national societies in
one-dimensional top-down processes; and transnational or global legal pluralism, which em-
phasizes the coexistence of different legal orders and normative contestations among them.
Giving a comprehensive overview (including references) of the respective merits and limi-
tations of existing theories, Shaffer [40] and Halliday and Shaffer [26] introduce a further,
socio-legal notion termed transnational legal order (TLO). It builds on these approaches and
is defined as a social order of transnational scope consisting of ”a collection of formalized
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the under-
standing and practice of law across national jurisdictions.” We explain the determinants
influencing transnational legal processes through which legal norms are constructed, con-
veyed, and institutionalized based on the concept of TLO, owing to its ability to highlight
both the legal and institutional aspects justifying the proposed governance framework.
Disaggregating the above definition into two parts — (1) formalized legal norms pro-
duced solely or partially by some type of transnational legal organization or network, which
are (2) aimed at inducing changes within nation-states — we will first give account of the be-
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wildering variety of governance arrangements characterizing modern international relations,
and then illuminate the complex ways in which legal norms interact and institutionalize.
The terms international and transnational shall be used interchangeably, referring to norms
and institutions spanning national boundaries (whether global or geographically more re-
stricted in scope).
Turning to the first element of our TLO definition, both the norms and the institutions
issuing them come in a diverse array of forms. Norms are contained in various formal texts of
softer or harder legal character such as treaties, conventions, codes, model laws, standards,
administrative rules and guidelines, and judicial judgments. International institutionaliza-
tion displays a similar diversity featuring public intergovernmental (also called international)
organizations (IGOs or IOs) and private non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of varying
levels of formality [28, 39, 46]. The widespread use of both hard and soft legalization in
international governance begs the questions of what hard and soft law are and what drives
actors’ choices between disparate legal and institutional settings.
Note that the existing literature is divided on what constitutes hard and soft law.
Some authors concentrate on legal rules’ binding quality either in binary terms or along
a continuum between fully binding legal instruments and purely political, non-binding ar-
rangements, while others focus on their ability to impact behavior. For a good overview
see [25, 41, 4]. Because it includes both the legal norms and the institutional arrangements
responsible for their development within the scope of its analysis, the most interesting def-
inition for our purposes is the one adopted by Abbott and Snidal. They distinguish hard
from soft law along three dimensions, namely (1) the extent of rules’ precision, (2) the
degree of legal obligation they establish, and (3) whether or not they delegate authority to
a third-party decision-maker for interpreting and implementing the law. Hard law refers to
legally binding obligations that are either precise or can be made such by adjudication or
further clarifying regulation, and that empower a third party to oversee their interpretation
and enforcement. Soft law, on the other hand, embodies legal instruments that exhibit
some degree of softness along any of these three dimensions.
Guzman and Meyer [25] and Abbott and Snidal [4] provide a very instructive comparison
of the relative advantages and disadvantages of hard and soft legalization and the various
factors that determine actors’ preferences towards different types of international governance
arrangements.
Hard legalization is typically characterized by a coherent, established, and formalized
institutional and procedural framework to ensure smooth implementation, elaboration, and
enforcement of commitments. These arrangements are generally perceived as legitimate, re-
sulting in a concomitant enhanced compliance-pull, and backed up by international law that
provides international actors readily available mechanisms (e.g., for recognition or enforce-
ment) to order their relations. The combination of these factors enhances the credibility of
commitments by constraining opportunistic behavior and increasing the costs of reneging;
reduces post-contracting transaction costs by restricting/constraining attempts to alter the
status quo by way of frequent renegotiation, persuasion, or coercive behavior; allows parties
to pursue political strategies through legal rather than political channels at low political
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cost; and solves problems of incomplete contracting by vesting an administrative or judicial
institution with power for interpreting and clarifying rules intentionally left imprecise in
anticipation of unforeseeable future contingencies. Yet, hard legalization comes at certain
costs: it restricts actors’ behavioral freedom, entails potentially severe sovereignty implica-
tions, and is less effective in accommodating diversity or adapting to changing circumstances
by reason of its relative rigidity.
Thus, in many instances, softer forms of legalization, which offer some of hard law’s perks
yet alleviate its intrinsic disadvantages through their flexible, more or less informal coop-
eration mechanisms, may better serve parties’ purposes. By relaxing the level of formality
along one or more of the dimensions precision, obligation, and delegation, soft legalization
minimizes initial contracting costs and facilitates speedy conclusion of agreements. Bargain-
ing problems become less pronounced, negotiation and drafting requires less scrutiny, and
there is no need for potentially challenging approval and ratification processes. Thanks to
soft legal commitments’ malleable cooperation frameworks, parties retain more control over
the overall design and organization of their cooperation, incur lower sovereignty costs, and
have an easily adjustable system at their disposal to deal with change and uncertainty. Soft
law also has a way of evening out power asymmetries by securing and perpetuating powerful
actors’ interests at lower sovereignty costs, while at the same time shielding the weak from
their pressure. Furthermore, soft law is the only directly available instrument to non-state
actors for ordering their interactions. Due to their conciliatory properties, softer forms of
legalization leave actors time to acquire sufficient information and expertise to gradually
test and develop solutions to problems, encouraging collective learning processes and ever
deeper cooperation between them — benefits that plentifully compensate soft law’s central
weakness: diminished compliance pull.
In conclusion, the choice between harder and softer types of legalization involves a
context-dependent tradeoff, which actors should carefully consider on a case-by-case basis.
Vabulas and Snidal [46] describe the pros and cons of institutional formality and the trade-
offs actors face when moving along a broad spectrum of intergovernmental organizational
formality — especially between formal and informal intergovernmental institutions (FIGOs
and IIGOs) — in an analogous fashion.
These three analyses show that, in general, actors opt for hard law/higher institutional
formality when they (1) wish to enter into a binding commitment in issue areas subject to a
high degree of consensus, because violations are hard to detect, or parties wish to signalize
their intention to engage in sincere cooperation; (2) are willing to accept sovereignty costs
stemming from delegating decision-making authority to a central body in order to estab-
lish stronger collective oversight over issue areas where the probability of violations is high
and monitoring and enforcement is important; (3) put more value on collective control of
information, for instance, to unveil violations and increase peer pressure to induce univer-
sal compliance; (4) aim for lower long-term transaction costs to effectively tackle recurring
or clear-cut issues in standard operating procedures; (5) intend to set up a sophisticated
centralized administration to provide legitimacy and stability for supporting complex work
processes such as the design and elaboration of norms, coordination involving multiple par-
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Hard Law/High Institutional Formality Soft Law/Low Institutional Formality
binding commitment flexible cooperation arrangements
delegation/high sovereignty costs state autonomy/low sovereignty costs
collective control of information close control of information
low long-term transaction costs low initial contracting costs
complex centralized administration minimalist administrative functions
routine management crisis/uncertainty management
Table 1: Tradeoffs in legalization/institutional formality.
ties, or judiciary and/or enforcement procedures; (6) are faced with the task of managing
routine problems, which is more easily done with established administrative and implement-
ing systems.
Conversely, soft law/lower institutional formality is preferable when actors (1) want to
maintain flexibility to deal with uncertainty, distribution problems, diversity, and changing
circumstances; (2) prefer to preserve state autonomy and avoid sovereignty intrusions be-
cause welfare gains of cooperation outweigh the potential for defection and opportunism so
that agreements are self-enforcing once any focal point for discussions has been established,
or when external effects elicited by domestic actions are negligible; (3) insist on avoiding
formal transparency mechanisms to maintain closer control of information typically among
a more homogeneous group; (4) need lower initial contracting costs to speed up negotia-
tions to be able to act fast (e.g., in crisis situations) or because hard law is not available
for lack of consensus; (5) find that minimalist administrative functions are sufficient to
support their purposes; (6) must manage high uncertainty (e.g., in initial stages of coop-
eration or in new/complex issue area) and want to allow themselves time for coordination
and establishing common ground without making strong commitments.
Sometimes soft law eventually paves the way towards harder forms of legalization and
cooperation becomes increasingly formalized, but in many cases soft legalization and insti-
tutional informality have their own justification. In practice, both highly institutionalized
FIGOs, such as the United Nations (UN) or World Trade Organization (WTO), IIGOs
allowing for laxer cooperation, like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),
private NGOs, for instance the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and hybrid
forms can be fairly successful and instrumental actors in international lawmaking.
Table 1 gives an overview of the above outlined six tradeoffs actors have to weigh when
choosing their desired level of legalization/institutional formalization.
Moving on to the second part of our TLO definition, transnational legal norms directly or
indirectly pursue the ultimate goal to induce shifts in countries’ policies and individuals’ nor-
mative preferences through various formal or informal channels. This generates convoluted,
recursive cycles of international lawmaking processes across diverse transnational and na-
tional fora, until norms eventually settle and institutionalize [40]. Halliday and Shaffer [26]
note that transnational norm-making may encounter difficulties in the following situations:
First, actors may find themselves caught up in diagnostic struggles over the framing of prob-
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lems, which favors particular alliances and antagonisms, supporting diagnoses reflecting the
respective interests of these groupings. Second, domestic implementation of transnationally
agreed rules is frequently thwarted and a new cycle of lawmaking is triggered by parties
who are influential at the national level, but are not represented or are unsuccessful in inter-
national negotiations and therefore refuse to accept such norms as legitimate — a situation
referred to as actor mismatch. Third, in their endeavor to reach widely accepted compro-
mises, parties often resort to vague language or leave delicate issues unresolved in their
agreements. The resulting ambiguity and built-in contradictions of transnational norms
open avenues for nationally fragmented, likely conflicting implementation, again calling for
further transnational lawmaking to eliminate related problems.
Inspired by Shaffer [40], we now describe the recursive processes of international law-
making, which encompass mutual interactions both vertically between transnational and
domestic venues, as well as horizontally among various TLOs. Vertically, transnational
norms impact states in a process referred to as state change. Their impact can encompass
the whole or parts of the state (location of change), it may occur in a slow, progressive
process or abruptly owing to unexpected circumstances (timing of change), and across five
interrelated dimensions. The most obvious aspect of state change is the dynamic evolution
of domestic legal systems elicited by the formal national enactment of transnational law.
Formal enactment may or may not have a substantial effect on rules’ practical implemen-
tation depending on the extent to which the transnationally induced change is viewed as
legitimate. In more subtle ways, however, these primary legal changes set much broader
systemic transformations in motion with potentially heavy social repercussions. For one
thing, they continuously reshape established governance models by altering the allocation
of functions between the state, the market, and other forms of social ordering. At times,
this prompts more state intervention, giving birth to new public and public-private hybrid
agencies, while at other times it propels deregulatory tendencies resulting in a retreat of
state administration and simultaneous engagement in self-regulation by the private sector.
Moreover, transnational legal processes are often responsible for revamping states’ institu-
tional architecture. They shift power between different branches of government and upset
the division of responsibilities among existing state institutions, sometimes giving rise to
new additions to the institutional landscape. It is not hard to see that domestic systems
may starkly differ, and such fragmentation often entails devastating consequences in issue
areas with cross-border effects. These legal, governance, and institutional changes directly
affect individuals by reconfiguring markets for professional expertise, which, in turn, feeds
back into the adaptation of governance models by, e.g., a move towards more technocratic
forms of governance. This highlights an important, yet admittedly somewhat elusive point,
namely that not only institutions but also individuals — acting as conduits facilitating
the diffusion of transnational norms — play a crucial role in domestic and transnational
lawmaking. The fifth domain of state change concerns the modifications in patterns of asso-
ciation and mechanisms of accountability across various national and international sites of
governance. These shifts ultimately shape individuals’ legal culture and consciousness, as
well as their expectations towards the state, triggering new processes of state change where
10
these views conflict with the prevailing state of affairs.
The extent, location, and timing of state change hinges on three clusters of factors per-
taining to the TLO’s nature, its relation to the receiving state, and the receiving state’s
peculiarities. First, TLOs are generally better received if perceived legitimate, i.e., norms
are adopted by respected actors with preferably similar interests, in a fair (especially non-
coercive) process, and they effectively tackle designated target problems. Myriads of inter-
national and national, state and non-state actors interact in complementary or conflicting
ways in shaping every aspect of transnational lawmaking. They seek to legitimize rules that
serve their purposes and delegitimize those running against them. Powerful players typi-
cally dictate the outcome of such struggles. TLOs are more likely to have real behavioral
impact if they consist of accepted, clear, and well-understood norms. As discussed above,
binding hard law does not necessarily score better in this respect. In a large part, TLOs’
coherence is a function of the quality and quantity of their horizontal interaction, and can
be threatened where significantly overlapping TLOs interact in an antagonistic rather than
complementary fashion [41].
As far as TLOs’ relation to the receiving state is concerned, powerful actors sometimes
resort to coercive measures to impose their will on weaker countries. However, because
coercion irrevocably destroys norms’ legitimacy, changes forced on states in this manner
are at best symbolic and short-lived before they are successfully blocked at the stage of do-
mestic implementation. Another essential prerequisite for the sustainability of transnation-
ally triggered change is the support of intermediaries, who link transnational and national
lawmaking processes and are deeply familiar with the interests of both sides. Whether
government representatives, industry specialists, academics, social movement leaders, or
professionals employed with various public or private organizations on the national and in-
ternational platform, these intermediaries are instrumental in coordinating communication,
easing tensions, and conveying norms between the national and transnational levels.
Finally, the single most important condition for transnational legal norms’ national
acceptance is their conformity with the target country’s existing cultural and institutional
settings and pursued reform initiatives. It strongly depends on the receiving country’s
prevailing power configurations, institutional capacities, path dependencies, and cultural
disposition, and tends to decrease as the distance between the transnational and national
contexts and interests and/or the extent of state change increases.
This concludes our analysis of transnational legal ordering, highlighting the main factors
instrumental in determining transnational legal norms’ efficiency in influencing the behavior
of states and their various constituencies. Our aim was to show that the choice of gover-
nance arrangements for an issue area in question — in our case AI — crucially determines
the overall efficiency of the regulatory regime governing it. We have also seen that legal
norms and lawmaking processes interact in complex ways between the transnational and
national levels. This means we must strive to design AI governance frameworks that are
consistent across these levels, ensuring that all actors affected by regulation are appropri-
ately represented at some point in the process, and hence willing to accept any rules the
frameworks produce. We now turn to our proposal on how an international AI governance
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framework could look like.
3 Proposal for a New International Artificial Intelligence Or-
ganization
International institutions are the prevalent vehicles of international cooperation in our inter-
connected world. When a critical mass of states and/or non-state actors feel that transna-
tional cooperation is necessary to solve a problem that is impossible to tackle by isolated
national measures, they establish a new IGO or NGO for that particular purpose. Based
on legal and international relations definitions in circulation — see [28, 39, 46] — we de-
fine an IGO as a formal entity (1) established by an international agreement governed by
international law; (2) with at least three (sometimes two) members — typically states but
increasingly also IGOs; and (3) having at least one organ with a will distinct from that of its
members. FIGOs’ organizational purpose is laid down in a binding international agreement
such as a treaty or a formal legal act of another IGO, their membership is clearly defined
in the founding legal act, and they have a permanent and significant institutionalization in
place. By contrast, IIGOs operate based on an explicitly shared, but informal expectation
about purpose, their membership is not always clear, as members are explicitly associated
but only by non-legal mutual acknowledgment, and they do not possess any significant insti-
tutionalization. NGOs differ from IGOs in that they are not created by treaty — meaning
they are governed by national rather than international law — and their membership is
made up of non-state actors.
Given the severity and global nature of AI’s anticipated impact on humanity, we expect
it to join the long line of issue areas requiring interstate cooperation, raising the question
of establishing an IGO at some point in the future. Against this background, we propose
the creation of the IAIO as a new IGO, which could initially serve as a focal point of
policy debates on AI-related matters and — given sufficient international support — acquire
increasing role in their regulation over time. We start by determining the degree of desired
institutional formalization by examining, in turn, the six above elaborated tradeoffs in
relation to AI.
Binding commitment vs. flexible cooperation arrangements: As pointed out earlier, AI
will fundamentally transform human society worldwide. Since this process of transforma-
tion is likely to be inescapable for any single state, states will probably wish to cooperate
sincerely. Also, violations will be difficult to detect as keeping pace with technological
innovation will require considerable technical expertise and capacities, presumably exceed-
ing especially weaker countries’ capabilities and evoking severe power asymmetries. While
apart from this latter circumstance, these factors speak for hard legal commitments, it
must be kept in mind that AI research and AI-human interactions are relatively young
phenomena and their novelty severely restricts our ability to anticipate the spectrum and
extent of the impending changes, let alone the dimension of the problems they will raise.
Many AI instantiations encroach on our most basic rights, pose an existential threat, or
bring up profound ethical and social questions, not to mention that they will utterly and
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completely upset our legal system. So, we are looking at heated debates among radically
diverse parties over a variety of uncertain issues, which may change in rapid and currently
unimaginable ways — conditions that, based on past experience, do not exactly favor inter-
national consensus. Therefore, we need all the flexibility we can get to acquire familiarity
with the issues at hand, sort out differences, and establish common ground, before we can
contemplate drawing up a more binding framework for cooperation.
Delegation/high sovereignty costs vs. state autonomy/low sovereignty costs: Weaponized
AI technologies and certain data mining practices are clearly relevant for national security.
As this is a sensitive issue area involving particularly high sovereignty costs, at least ini-
tially, states will show reluctance to give up and delegate decision-making authority to the
IAIO. In the long run, however, powerful collective oversight and enforcement mechanisms
will probably be indispensable in order to curb incentives for violations and opportunistic
behavior, which should otherwise be high in light of the major shifts in international power
constellations triggered by changes in countries’ competitive positions. Also, domestic AI
policies will produce significant externalities, affecting other countries. Based on this anal-
ysis, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a highly institutionalized organization with
binding legislative, dispute resolution, and enforcement authority would be better suited as
new international AI regulator. Nevertheless, the political reality remains that until suffi-
cient clarity is reached on the IAIO’s precise purpose, membership, the issues to regulate,
and the broad directions to follow, international consensus supporting such a high degree
of institutionalization is off the table.
Collective control of information vs. close control of information: History shows that
states are generally cautious about sharing information on fate-changing technologies, which
speaks for close control of information with respect to AI. However, if and when we manage
to gather consensus for hard legal commitments (e.g., treaty on certain AI applications), we
will probably need to be more forthcoming with certain information to ensure compliance
with those instruments. This is again a strong argument in favor of starting cooperation on
AI regulation in a softer institutional framework and using soft law instruments, although
a move towards harder legalization seems to be desirable over time.
Low long-term transaction costs vs. low initial contracting costs: International discus-
sions on AI are just beginning and powerful states will likely have divergent preferences
with respect to the regulation of this high-impact field. Compounded with the difficulties
discussed in the context of previous tradeoffs, this makes the prospect of reaching a work-
able international consensus in the short term rather remote. Yet crucially, swift regulatory
response is imperative to prevent proliferating unregulated AI applications from causing
social harm and to ensure that the opportunity presented by the rise of AI is harvested to
humanity’s benefit rather than detriment — an aim best facilitated by lowering initial con-
tracting costs with soft legalization and low institutional formalization. This is not to say
that the idea of setting up a more robust governance framework with standard operating
procedures should be abandoned. On the contrary, such a step has merit, but only at a
later stage, in possession of sufficient expertise and political consensus to better assess the
implications of various policy options and formulate informed policy recommendations.
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Complex centralized administration vs. minimalist administrative functions: Similar
considerations apply as far as the level of administrative sophistication of the IAIO is con-
cerned. In the initial stage of determining the purpose of the organization, its membership,
the issues that need to be regulated, and the backbone of its regulatory agenda, less is prob-
ably more. Later, with perhaps binding legal instruments governing selected aspects of AI
for a wide membership, work will get more complex, requiring stronger oversight, dispute
resolution, and enforcement mechanisms as well as more powerful bureaucratic functions to
service them.
Routine management vs. crisis/uncertainty management : In view of AI’s novelty, ex-
treme complexity, unforeseeable evolution, and the controversies it is expected to elicit
among a very heterogeneous circle of members, we are up against managing an extraordi-
narily uncertain issue area. Consequently, we need time and soft legalization’s flexibility to
establish commonly shared ideas, interests, cooperation mechanisms, and solutions, which
can then form the basis of more formalized cooperation arrangements in the future.
In summary, at least initially, the IAIO should start out as an IIGO displaying a rel-
atively low level of institutional formality. It should use soft law instruments, such as
non-binding recommendations, guidelines, and standards, to support national policymak-
ers in the conception and design of AI-related regulatory policies. Its interim goal should
be to galvanize international cooperation, fostering internationally consistent AI policy ap-
proaches by directly engaging governments in this domain as early as possible, before states
develop their own, diverging policies, which may be hard to rescind without political dam-
age. Like many other key IGOs, the IAIO should be hosted by a neutral country to provide
for a safe environment, limit avenues for political conflict, and build a climate of mutual
tolerance and appreciation. Whether the international community wishes to move towards
more formalized cooperation at some point in the future remains to be seen. Diverse in-
stitutional choices in other areas of international cooperation suggest that many different
settings can be successful. Sometimes informality turns out to be the key to an organi-
zation’s success. This seems to be the case with the Bank of International Settlements
especially during its initial years of operation and World War II, or the BCBS and the
different G-Groups at present [9]. Another common trajectory is when initially informal
arrangements turn into formal frameworks of cooperation. A case in point is the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) gradual transformation into the WTO [4].
Finally, there are examples for remarkably successful, sustained, complementary, and mutu-
ally beneficial cooperation between several organizations of varying institutional formality
in the same issue area. This sort of relationship is characteristic for the IMF and various
G-Groups in financial regulation, or the Australia Group (AG), an IIGO, and the Orga-
nization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a FIGO, in the regulation of
chemical and biological weapons [46]. So, even though the prospect of a formal global AI
agency with regulatory and perhaps also conflict resolution powers is rather remote at the
moment, higher or even full institutional formality might become the best option one day.
As mentioned in the Introduction, when we first came up with the idea to propose the
establishment of a global AI governance framework, there was virtually no discussion — let
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alone one involving governments — addressing institutional architectural design questions.
Instead, many newly-formed non-governmental stakeholders were just starting to work on
selected high-priority topics in an uncoordinated manner. This led us to suggest the for-
mation of a new intergovernmental organization, which we dubbed IAIO. However, since
then work on AI has intensified in a number of existing organizations, and new actors and
initiatives have also appeared on the horizon. This presents a new situation: Instead of
a void, we now have a rudimentary institutional structure. Our goal should be to build
on these foundations and find an institutional configuration that maximizes incentives for
cooperation and minimizes competition between these new international AI policy actors.
As long as one of them can take on the role we envisage for the IAIO — an issue we will now
examine — it is counterproductive to add yet another institution to the existing landscape
of potential AI regulators.
In February 2020, capitalizing on previous AI work done by the organization, the OECD
has established a new AI Policy Observatory (OECD.AI) [35]. This inclusive platform for
public policy on AI has the purpose to facilitate international dialogue and collaboration
between a wide range of stakeholders representing governments, domestic and international
regulators, the private sector, academia, the technical community, and civil society. It
provides multidisciplinary, evidence-based policy analysis in areas most strongly affected by
AI. Since its inception in 1961, the OECD has proven to be a successful global standard-
setter in multiple public policy areas — the most recent case in point are the OECD AI
Principles adopted in 2019 [34], which constitute the first intergovernmental standard on
AI. The organization’s global reach and multi-stakeholder approach facilitates the gradual
development of widely accepted best practices by encouraging open, international dialogue,
comparison of each other’s policy responses, and mutual learning. As an intergovernmental,
yet informal forum for AI policymaking, OECD.AI provides the necessary flexibility that
is required in the initial stages of global AI policy coordination. At the same time, it
is backed by the OECD’s established, formal institutional arrangements, which — if the
international community so desires in the future — may help it transition into a more formal
vehicle of cooperation. Should the grouping have aspirations to become the undisputed focal
point of global AI policymaking, it will have to find a way to officially represent the entire
international community rather than just OECD countries. Ultimately, OECD.AI’s success
and the trajectory of its evolution will depend on the global political climate.
According to the decision of its 40th General Conference in November 2019, UNESCO
has also embarked on an ambitious two-year project with a view to draft the first global stan-
dards on AI ethics [43, 44]. This mission statement seems narrower than that of OECD.AI
at first sight. However, it has to be seen within UNESCO’s broader mandate to build
peace through international cooperation in education, science, and culture, and contribute
to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN General Assembly in
2015 as part of the organization’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Moreover,
it has to be noted that UNESCO’s mode of operation is also characterized by a highly in-
clusive multi-stakeholder approach, engaging multifaceted, interdisciplinary expertise and
powerful parties from around the globe. Again, political considerations will play a central
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role in determining the direction in which UNESCO’s AI work-stream will develop over
time. In any case, this is another informal grouping embedded into and supported by a —
this time truly global — FIGO, which could decide to broaden its mandate and become the
sort of intergovernmental AI policy body we propose to put in place.
Another potentially interesting new initiative is the Global Governance on AI Roundtable
(GGAR) [51]. The first two editions of the Roundtable in 2018 and 2019 have been hosted
by the World Government Summit (WGS) held in Dubai. Likewise employing an interna-
tional, interdisciplinary, and multi-stakeholder approach, this endeavor’s primary objective
is to assist the UAE State Minister for AI in developing the UAE’s AI strategy, which was
announced in 2017. However, by moving the venue of discussion away from developed west-
ern countries, which traditionally lead global dialogue in virtually all issue areas, GGAR
offers a radically novel and different political context. This may resonate better with cer-
tain countries and provide an opportunity to bring parties with previously irreconcilable
political positions on board. This hope is reflected in GGAR’s other key aim: To serve
as a neutral forum that coordinates with a wide range of existing stakeholders vested in
global AI policymaking, enabling the international community to shape globally accepted
and culturally adaptable norms for AI governance. GGAR is a brand new informal group-
ing, which — if it awakens the international communities’ interest — could be morphed into
a global intergovernmental AI agency and perhaps evolve into a more formal organization
without being constrained by existing path dependencies.
In June 2018, France and Canada announced an initiative to establish an Interna-
tional Panel on Artificial Intelligence (IPAI), later renamed Global Partnership on AI
(GPAI) [3, 24]. Once taking up work, the GPAI’s mission will be to support and guide
responsible, human-centric AI adoption, respecting human rights and ensuring inclusion,
diversity, innovation, and economic growth. It is also envisaged to rely on interdisciplinary,
multi-stakeholder mechanisms to harness leading global expertise, and collaborate with
other international AI policy bodies to facilitate AI research, information sharing, and the
development of widely accepted, international best practices. At the present juncture, there
is little clarity on the GPAI’s organizational structure, relationship to other existing AI pol-
icy actors, specific mandate, and political reception, so it is hard to predict if it could grow
into a universally accepted, intergovernmental AI policymaking institution.
A last organization we would like to mention here is the World Economic Forum (WEF),
in particular its Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) launched in 2017 [2]. The
WEF is an NGO founded on the principle of public-private cooperation, which also relies on
a global network of expertise, partnering with a wide range of stakeholders from both the
public and private sectors to contribute to shaping local, regional, and global policy agendas.
4IR is intended to function as a hub for global, multi-stakeholder cooperation that takes the
lead in co-designing and piloting innovative policy frameworks and governance protocols
related to emerging technologies, including but not limited to AI. The interesting thing
about the WEF is that as a non-governmental entity, it is led by the private sector and only
involves governments indirectly. Yet it essentially works with the same methods as the other
intergovernmental initiatives listed above. What is more, by focusing on well delineated
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pilot projects implemented jointly with selected government partners, it has substantial real
impact on AI policies and industry practices at the national, regional, and global levels.
While as an NGO, the 4IR cannot directly assume the role of a global intergovernmental
AI regulatory body, it is definitely an actor with major influence that needs to be taken
into account in the design of the suggested global AI governance framework.
There are also several other intergovernmental bodies that do valuable work on AI and
are instrumental in steering global AI policies. Examples include the European Commis-
sion [1, 19], the Council of Europe [15], and the G7 and G20 groups. However, as European
institutions, the first two represent the EU rather than the international community. As for
the informal G-Groups, these have a broader focus than just AI and there are good reasons
to preserve them in their current roles as quickly mobilizable, flexible vehicles that devise
informal solutions supporting the work of FIGOs in various policy domains. Hence, neither
of them constitute adequate fora to serve the purpose we envisage for the IAIO. That said,
these are also highly influential stakeholders that need to be involved in any international
AI governance arrangements.
To sum up, OECD.AI, UNESCO’s AI group, GGAR, and the GPAI are potentially
viable vehicles to take on the role of an intergovernmental AI regulatory agency as an al-
ternative to setting up an entirely new organization in the form of the IAIO. This ends our
excursus in the domain of international lawmaking, which also shows that beyond the opti-
mal level of legalization and institutional formality, the proposed new intergovernmental AI
policy body — be it one of the above introduced new players or a newly established IAIO
— must fulfill a number of more subtle requirements to be perceived as a fair and legiti-
mate regulator. While leaving the elaboration of details to political decisions and future
research, we would like to stress three points: (1) It is necessary to put an IGO in charge of
leading international AI regulatory efforts to ensure sufficient government involvement and
impact on domestic AI policies, as well as to keep the option open to move towards more
formal institutional arrangements. (2) We must maintain an inclusive, interdisciplinary,
and multi-stakeholder approach in all aspects global AI policy design, including the initial
deliberations related to the IAIO’s or its equivalent’s establishment, modus operandi, and
regulatory agenda. This is the only way to ensure the availability of expertise necessary
to effectively tackle AI-related challenges. (3) Finally, it is paramount to choose an insti-
tutional setting that adequately reflects all relevant AI actors’ interests and existing power
constellations to guarantee the widespread acceptance and legitimacy of the proposed global
AI governance framework. There is already some collaboration between the policy bodies
and other stakeholders introduced in this paper. However, the status quo is much less
effective compared to what would be possible if a well-designed and universally accepted
global AI governance framework organized around a single agency was introduced. Such a
framework could streamline all these stakeholders’ efforts ensuring an appropriate division
of labor by optimally exploiting synergies in a clear and transparent manner. We are not
proposing a complete overhaul of the current system, merely to eliminate inefficiencies by
introducing an institutional architecture that maximizes collaboration and minimizes the
duplication of tasks and competition between all actors involved. As mentioned earlier,
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the quality of a governance framework crucially determines the efficiency of the rules it
produces: We cannot have efficient and widely accepted transnational AI norms if the ad-
equacy and legitimacy of the governance framework producing them is put into question.
Hence, in an ideal world, figuring out the right governance arrangements logically precedes
the creation of any rules.
4 Communication: An Insidious Regulatory Challenge
Like all emerging technologies, AI’s successful societal adoption hinges on trust, which, in
turn, flows from an agile, transparent, and sustainable regulatory environment. As we have
seen, governance arrangements are just a part of that, and this paper has only provided
some preliminary thoughts on the international setting. Ideally, the proposed global AI
governance framework needs to be complemented by robust national AI regulatory regimes,
which duly represent national interests and reflect the domestic stakeholder landscape. We
respect that — being shaped by each country’s unique political situation as well as cultural
and other path dependencies — national regimes will inevitably display differences. Still,
some international coordination in setting up domestic regimes is desirable to prevent dis-
crepancies which may lead to clashes between countries. Leaving these questions aside for
now, we would like to direct attention to two instances of what we believe to be ultimately
communication challenges: (1) issues around the general perception of the notion of regula-
tion, and (2) interdisciplinary and inter-stakeholder communication barriers. Both are less
obvious but highly pernicious problems, which currently heavily stifle efforts to establish
AI regulatory regimes at all levels. Thus, both the international community and individual
countries may find these insights helpful when designing the fundamental elements of their
respective regulatory regimes.
As noted in the Introduction, people usually think of regulation as binding rules forced
on society by the state either in the form of purely domestic regulatory measures or im-
plementing international legal commitments. Especially businesses see regulation as an
obstacle designed by the state — the enemy — to restrict their activities, which they con-
sequently somehow have to work around. Admittedly, there is some truth in this view, as
regulation ideally aims to incentivize socially rather than individually optimal behavior, and
hence unavoidably restrains activities that threaten to decrease society’s welfare. However
— apart from the aforementioned fact that creating rules is just a small part of regula-
tion — this conception raises at least two additional problems by assuming an adversarial
relationship between the state, businesses, and civil society.
First, it does not necessarily reflect the genuine preferences of these three stakeholder
groups — which may or may not contradict depending on the particular scenario in question.
Take AI innovation for instance. At first sight, innovators’ interests misalign with those of
the state and civil society when it comes to safety considerations. The former may see
an opportunity for cost saving by engaging in corner-cuttings, while the latter definitely
value safety very highly. Yet this only holds true on the short run, if at all, as safety issues
destroy society’s trust and hence markets in AI technologies. The resulting situation is
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against everybody’s interests and potentially even welfare decreasing: Innovators are no
longer able to derive any financial gains from developing AI, while state and society are
deprived from any benefits of innovation.
Second, it is not in line with modern regulatory reality [7, 8]. Regulation is no longer a
responsibility reserved solely to the state but a decentered process of co-creation, involving
multiple stakeholders. The main driver behind this regulatory paradigm shift is the increas-
ing complexity and rapid pace of change of modern regulatory domains, which makes them
a prohibitively big challenge for the state — or any other stakeholder for that matter — to
tackle alone. The recognition that no single party has the knowledge, power, or capacity
to effectively control and regulate all segments of society has led modern regulatory theory
to move away from the state’s regulatory monopoly and advocate a shared responsibility of
different actors for regulation instead. According to current regulatory best practices, regu-
lation should be a series of convoluted multi-stakeholder interactions, in which autonomous
social actors and government stakeholders are mutually interdependent co-producers of
regulation, jointly constructing knowledge and exercising power. The core aim is to cre-
ate dynamically adaptive patterns of interaction between a multitude of regulatory actors
and strategies that best serve the public interest. In widespread opinion, hybrid regula-
tory mixes and networks deliver the best results in today’s globalized and interconnected
world. Yet, finding the right blend of institutions and instruments remains challenging.
This fundamentally different understanding of regulation dictates the use of diverse regu-
latory strategies — incorporating both more state-driven and self-regulatory elements —
and coordination between multiple regulatory actors drawing on wide interdisciplinary and
multi-stakeholder expertise. So yes, regulation will always remain state-driven to a certain
extent. But it is also an indirect, flexible, and sensitive process of steering, coordinating,
balancing, and influencing that not only gives affected societal stakeholders an opportunity
to stand up for their interests but cannot be efficiently done without their participation.
Unfortunately, all this is easier in theory than in practice. It is hard enough to build
a regulatory regime that is sufficiently inclusive to ensure that all stakeholders’ interests
are duly taken into account, really putting public interest first. The trickiest part, how-
ever, is to maintain high levels of engagement, satisfaction, and performance in the face of
changing conditions. A potential danger stakeholders currently active in AI policymaking
may encounter is loss of drive. In the past few years, a large number of public and private
bodies around the world have engaged individuals of diverse background into developing
solutions to various AI-related challenges. However, lacking clear objectives and adequate
coordination within and across such groupings, very little of that energy has been actually
transformed into concrete, implementable actions. Low productivity levels have already led
to a tangible decline of enthusiasm among participants in some venues, and we expect this
trend to continue, especially as the AI-hype continues to wane. This is undesirable, seeing
as governments depend on these stakeholders both in terms of expertise and regulatory
capacity, and it is also in the latter’s best interest to work with governments to implant
their preferences into policy initiatives. Hence, there is a sense of urgency in developing
regulatory regimes — perhaps also relying on self-regulatory organizations or otherwise in-
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corporating self-regulatory features — that set well-defined regulatory objectives and more
efficiently coordinate all stakeholders involved.
To link back to the point of communication challenges raised earlier: In our experience,
the true nature of regulation — including the above explained relationship of co-dependence
between different regulatory actors and the benefits that stem from participating in reg-
ulatory processes — are generally not well understood or met by strong skepticism by
stakeholders involved in AI policymaking across various fora. Our recommendations to
alleviate these problems are twofold: (1) Acknowledging those national and transnational
AI policy actors that already comply with modern regulatory best practices, we urge those
not yet on this path to embrace and apply these insights in practice when designing their
respective AI regulatory regimes. (2) Governments and international policymaking bodies
should approach actors they wish to involve in regulatory and policymaking processes with
a clear and realistically implementable agenda. They should unambiguously communicate
— better yet, educate — them about the nature of regulation, current regulatory best
practices, and their intention to follow them. We need to elicit a change of mindset about
regulation — not state-imposed restrictions but an opportunity to co-create regimes and
rules that serve aggregate collective preferences — and give stakeholders reason to trust
that these new expectations will be fulfilled in practice.
This leads us to the last point we would like to tackle in this paper, namely interdis-
ciplinary and inter-stakeholder communication barriers. As explained above, all modern
regulatory domains have their fair share of complexity. This holds all the more true for AI
regulation, as we are dealing with a diverse set of unusually fast-developing technologies,
which penetrate virtually all domains of human existence with far-reaching consequences.
To make matters worse, due to their complexity, the workings of AI technologies are very
hardly accessible for individuals without some technical background. Unfortunately, the
vast majority of people — including numerous policymakers and other stakeholders in-
volved in regulatory and policymaking processes — grapple with this problem. Owing to
the technological intricacies and AI’s widespread societal impacts on a global scale, de-
veloping sound regulatory approaches requires deep understanding of a wide spectrum of
multidisciplinary concepts and internationally concerted, collaborative efforts between mul-
tiple stakeholders: policymakers, the AI and other affected industries, academic institutions,
and civil society.
As previously noted, many AI policy actors are aware of these problems and aim to
gather the right bundle of expertise to the table. So at least on paper, we seem to be
doing just fine. The problem is that the interests, ways of thinking, and modus operandi of
different disciplines and stakeholder groups starkly deviate, inducing massive coordination
and communication challenges, not to mention frustration. An illustrative example for such
tensions are circles of frustration between government, industry, and academic stakeholders.
As the drivers of innovation and economic growth, businesses come up with cutting-edge so-
lutions and products to harness AI’s benefits. They are much more flexible and faster than
academia or the public sector, but do not necessarily have public interest at their heart.
Some also lead the way in R&D to underpin their business activity, but many operate on
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less sound theoretic foundations. As a consequence, businesses tend to be annoyed by gov-
ernments’ lack of expertise, and the slow pace with which both governments and academia
operate. Academic stakeholders excel in research, heavily contributing to developing the
theoretical foundations that allow for introducing new technologies into society. Often,
however, businesses and governments are not aware of existing research results that would
solve problems they wrestle with — a fact of life that understandably upsets academics.
Governments, in turn, ideally serve public interest, lack funding and resources comparable
to the private sector, and are often also short on expertise. Hence, they are frequently
overwhelmed when it comes to assessing the risks and benefits of new technologies, deciding
the fate of those technologies, and keeping pace with industry.
As regards interdisciplinary communication, knowledge transfer between disciplines is
far beneath the desired levels due to people’s inability to find a way to explain and un-
derstand each others’ problems and needs. This is counterproductive, as their pieces of
knowledge are complementary and cumulatively necessary to successfully tackle AI-related
challenges. In our view, a currently severe problem is that many research contributions —
e.g., dealing with various societal impacts of AI — and policy decisions are made without
due consultation of technical experts, even though the researchers or decision-makers ob-
viously lack the necessary technical background to make meaningful contributions to the
intersection of AI and their respective fields or to make informed policy decisions. This
not only upsets technically literate individuals, but also results in incorrect and technically
infeasible scientific recommendations and polices, both of which are very problematic. The
former provide flawed foundations for further research and policy action, and also confuse
technically illiterate readers. The latter promote the mis-assessment of AI, providing wrong
behavioral incentives and tricking society into believing themselves to be protected from
potential negative effects of these technologies.
These problems adversely affect the levels of engagement in regulatory processes and
in societal dialogues on AI, society’s trust in regulator’s ability to design and maintain
adequate AI regulatory regimes, and ultimately the acceptance and legitimacy of emerging
regimes and norms governing AI. We need to get better at collaborating with and actually
listening to each other, and make more responsible judgments about the limits of our own
expertise if we are serious about developing adequate AI regulatory regimes and technically
feasible rules and policy solutions.
5 Conclusion
Given the intensifying worldwide activism in AI regulation and AI’s substantial and global
impact on human society, we have highlighted some key regulatory considerations and
problems to assist domestic and international AI policymakers. We have also proposed a
consistent international regulatory framework — with either a new or a repurposed exist-
ing IGO as its focal point — to streamline and coordinate national policymaking efforts.
Learning from past experience in other regulatory fields, our objective is to offer a viable
framework for international regulatory cooperation in the issue area of AI to avoid the de-
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velopment of nationally fragmented AI policies, which may lead to international tensions.
Should our proposal find sufficient support in the international community, more concrete
steps towards setting up the here advocated regulatory framework, and regulatory policies
on specific AI issues can be elaborated.
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